Seonglae ChoAI Sandbox Notion
Prompt Injecting Your Way To Shell: OpenAI's Containerized ChatGPT Environment
Dive into OpenAI’s containerized ChatGPT environment, demonstrating how users can interact with its underlying structure through controlled prompt injections and file management techniques. By exploring ChatGPT's sandboxed Debian Bookworm environment, readers gain insights into navigating command executions, file manipulation, and the model's internal configuration, revealing both the potential and boundaries of OpenAI's secure design.
https://0din.ai/blog/prompt-injecting-your-way-to-shell-openai-s-containerized-chatgpt-environment
Claude Cowork
A general-purpose agent extending Claude Code with a non-developer UI. Internally runs in a virtualized AI Sandbox. Functionally similar to Claude Code, but with significantly improved accessibility through product packaging. The key risk is Prompt Injection. Anthropic explicitly states they cannot guarantee complete safety and advises caution with file and web access.
First impressions of Claude Cowork, Anthropic’s general agent
New from Anthropic today is Claude Cowork, a “research preview” that they describe as “Claude Code for the rest of your work”. It’s currently available only to Max subscribers ($100 …
https://simonwillison.net/2026/Jan/12/claude-cowork/#atom-everything
Claims that giving LLMs a code sandbox (virtual computer) (terminal/files/code execution/internet) causes "agentic" capabilities to spontaneously emerge and improve performance on non-coding tasks, without additional training